
















During the nineties the performance of many emerging economies was linked to their 
access to foreign capital and its impact on the real exchange rate. Colombia was not an 
exception, as it experienced a sharp boom and bust cycle during the period. Although a 
number  of  studies  have  attempted  to  explain  the  recent  underperformance  of  the 
Colombian economy, few attempts have been made at analyzing firm-level data. In this 
paper, we rely on information for a large sample of firms during 1995-2001 (nearly 8000 
firms on average) and examine the determinants of foreign indebtedness as well as the 
effects on firm performance of holding dollar debt amid changes in the real exchange 
rate (i.e. the so called “balance sheet effect”). While size is the most robust determinant 
of dollar indebtedness, matching seems to take place, to the extent that firms in more 
open  sectors  and  exporting  firms  have  higher  shares  of  dollar  debt.  In  spite  of  the 
limited amount of dollar indebtedness of Colombian firms in general, our estimations 
suggest  there  is  a  negative  balance  sheet  effect  on  firms’  performance  (i.e.  on 
profitability).  On  the  other  hand,  the  interaction  of  dollar  indebtedness  with  the  real 
exchange rate is generally not significant in our investment regressions.  
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CEDE   ￿￿
1  Introduction 
 
The traditional expansionary effect of a devaluation predicted by the Mundell-Fleming 
model has been recurrently subjected to criticism (i.e. Krugman and Taylor, 1978), and 
challenged on new grounds (Calvo, 1999, 2000, Calvo and Reinhart, 2000, Dornbusch, 
2001). The basic argument in this new strand of literature is that firms and governments 
that borrow in foreign currency and produce an output that is not entirely tradable face a 
currency mismatch which, following a devaluation, can produce a balance sheet effect 
that offsets any enhancement in competitiveness. Largely motivated by the failure of 
traditional  models  of  balance  of  payments  crisis  to  explain  the  financial  turmoil  in 
emerging markets during the late 1990’s, a number of authors have appealed to the so 
called “open economy Bernanke-Gertler” argument (Krugman, 1999a). According to this 
view, in a context of financial market imperfections and constraints where net worth 
affects  investment  levels  (Bernanke  and  Gertler,  1989),  substantial  levels  of  foreign 
currency  denominated  liabilities  imply  the  possibility  of  self-fulfilling  crises:  a  loss  of 
confidence by foreign investors and the capital flight that results leads to a currency 
depreciation and a balance sheet effect that depresses investment.  
 
The  actual  implications  and  policy  prescriptions  in  this  setting  have  not  been 
settled on theoretical grounds. On the one hand, some argue that a loose monetary 
policy after a crisis is not a remedy, as it reinforces the currency depreciation and its 
balance sheet effect (Krugman, 1999b). Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001) 
argue that the balance sheet effect of a devaluation might entail a decrease in economic 
activity which reduces money demand and weakens the currency even further. Thus, a 
currency crisis is a “bad” equilibrium, with low output and a weak exchange rate. They 
suggest that if credit supply does not react too strongly to changes in the interest rate, a 
tight monetary policy is the correct prescription to avoid a crisis.  
 
On the other hand, in a series of papers Céspedes, Chang and Velasco support 
the Mundell-Fleming prediction and argue against dollarization. They point out that the 
offsetting effect of increased home output and returns to investment generally imply that 
the  standard  Mundell-Fleming  expansionary  effect  of  devaluations  is  still  generated 
(Céspedes et al., 2000)
1. Their model suggests that fluctuations in domestic output and 
investment are larger and more persistent under fixed exchange rates. Nonetheless, 
balance sheet effects do matter in that they magnify the effects of foreign disturbances 
and  might  lead  to  a  situation  of  financial  fragility  –where  devaluations  increase  the 
country risk premium.  
 
If balance sheet effects matter, a puzzling question is why do domestic agents 
choose to hold foreign denominated liabilities in the first place. Explanations of the so 
called  “original  sin”—the  fact  that  developing  countries  cannot  borrow  in  their  own 
currencies  or  at  long  maturities—range  from  models  that  point  out  moral  hazard 
problems of fixed exchange rates and government policy (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and 
                                                 
1 The overall impact of a devaluation might indeed be contractionary, but only if inherited dollar liabilities are (implausibly) large and 
international financial markets very imperfect (Céspedes et al., 2002).   ￿￿
Rebelo, 1999; Schneider and Tornell, 2001) to those which consider the role of financial 
underdevelopment (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2000).  
 
In contrast to the theoretical discussion, empirical work on the determinants of 
liability dollarization and its “balance sheet effects” at the firm-level has been scarce and 
severely hindered by data availability. Exceptions include Bleakley and Cowan’s (2002, 
BC henceforth) study for a sample of publicly traded Latin American firms. They report 
that the effect on performance of holding dollar debt during a devaluation is positive 
because the negative net worth effect is more than compensated by the effects of a 
devaluation on ex post earnings. Furthermore, they suggest that this results from firms’ 
matching the currency composition of their liabilities and earnings in foreign exchange.  
 
These conclusions are not supported by Aguiar (2002), who studies investment 
in  post-crisis  Mexican  firms,  finding  an  important  negative  “balance  sheet  effect”  of 
devaluation on investment. Even though exporters outperform non-exporters in terms of 
profits  and  sales  after  a  devaluation,  their  investment  is  constrained  as  a  result  of 
holding  foreign  currency  denominated  debt.  Floating  the  currency  also  implies  an 
increase  in  sales  volatility,  which  further  reduces  investment.  Aguiar  does  find  that 
exporting and large firms tend to borrow more in dollars. These results are consistent 
with those presented in Gelos (2003), who uses a larger database of Mexican firms and 
finds that the share of dollar debt is positively correlated with imports, exports, and size.   
 
An important issue for policy discussion that has received some attention is the 
role  of  the  exchange  rate  regime  on  exchange  risk  hedging.  Arteta  (2002)  uses  a 
database on deposit and credit dollarization in developing and transition economies to 
examine  whether  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  encourage  banks  to  match  dollar-
denominated liabilities with assets. His results indicate that, if anything, floating regimes 
tend to exacerbate currency mismatches. According to Martínez and Werner (2002), the 
previous results are not supported in the case of firms in Mexico. These authors point 
out  that  the  “original  sin  hypothesis”  actually  implies  a  sort  of  natural  tendency  for 
liability dollarization that goes beyond the choice of exchange rate regime. A model that 
incorporates  these  elements  is  presented  and  tested,  and  results  indicate  that firms 
have taken exchange rate risk more seriously after flotation in 1994. Indeed, during the 
fixed exchange rate regime the share of dollar debt was mainly determined by the size 
of  the  firm  and  unaffected  by  the  composition  of  revenues,  whereas  during  floating 
exports became the sole determinant of dollar indebtedness.  
 
  All  in  all,  the  available  empirical  evidence  on  the  balance  sheet  effects  of 
devaluations is not conclusive. The final verdict has to come form the data  and the 
particular conditions of firms in specific countries. In this paper we study the firm-level 
effects of monetary and exchange rate developments in Colombia during 1995-2001. 
Like many other emerging economies, Colombia experienced positive and increasing 
levels of capital inflows during the first half of the 1990s that allowed for a respectable 
performance in terms of GDP growth. Nonetheless, a curtailment of foreign financing 
after 1997 has coincided with Colombia’s worst growth performance on record. Ample 
foreign financing brought about an appreciation of the real exchange rate between 1990   ￿￿
and  1997,  and a  significant real  depreciation  was  observed  since  (the effective  real 
exchange rate index rose from 82 to 105 in 4 years).
2  
 
At  the  second  half  of  1997,  the  time  the  band  came  under  attack,  many 
observers argued that the lackluster performance of the economy was associated with 
an ill-conceived monetary and exchange rate policy that kept interest rates too high and 
the  currency  too  strong.  Under  this  interpretation,  floating  the  currency  should  have 
reverted  the  trend  of  the  key  components  of  aggregate  demand.  The  stylized  facts 
indicate that during the period of floating the recovery of consumption and investment 
has been far from satisfactory, while non-traditional exports
3 have performed reasonably 
well. Whether this relatively poor performance is associated with a protracted effect of 
having instrumented a tight monetary policy to defend the currency when it came under 
attack and/or with the balance sheet effect associated with the depreciation following 
the floating of the currency is an empirical matter, better addressed at the level of the 
firm. In this paper, we rely on information for a large sample of firms during 1995-2001 
and examine the impact of the exchange and interest rates on the performance of firms 
with varying degrees of foreign indebtedness, output tradability, and imported inputs.  
 
Since the limited time dimension of our database makes the causal interpretation of 
macroeconomic  effects  on  firm  performance  problematic,  we  focus  on  the  effect  of 
exchange  and  interest  rate  movements  on  the  performance  of  firms  with  different 
characteristics.  Our  study  does  not  allow  us  to  pinpoint  the  overall  expansionary  or 
contractionary  effect  of  devaluations,  but  rather  the  existence  (or  lack  thereof)  of 
particular channels whereby the exchange rate affects firm performance
4.  
 
Our results suggest that matching does seem to take place in our sample, to the 
extent that firms in more open sectors and exporting firms are engaged more often in 
foreign indebtedness and have higher shares of dollar debt. Also, firm size is the most 
robust and significant determinant of dollar indebtedness. Although these results and 
the  limited  amount  of  dollar  denominated  indebtedness  in  Colombian  firms  tilt  the 
balance against finding any balance sheet effect of devaluations, we find evidence of a 
negative balance sheet effect on firms’ profitability. Results for investment, on the other 
hand, are rather mixed.  
 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data set that is used in 
section 4 to analyze the determinants and consequences of firm investment. In section 
3,  we  briefly  discuss  BC’s  analytical  framework  for  the  effects  of  exchange  rate 
devaluations on firm investment in  the  presence  of dollar indebtedness.  Section  4.1 
presents some regressions for the currency composition of debt, whereas section 4.2 
focuses  on  firm  performance  as  measured  by  profitability  and  investment.  The  fifth 
section concludes.   
                                                 
2 These exchange rate developments occurred in the context of a number of distinct regimes: a standard crawling peg until 1991; an 
informal band in 1992 and 1993 that accompanied an active sterilization policy; a formal band that was put in place in 1994 but had 
to be shifted a number of times; and a floating regime introduced in late 1999. 
3  Those different from coffee, oil and coal. 
4 Moreover, much of the balance sheet effect of devaluations in Colombia at the macroeconomic level is likely to occur in the public 
sector, as the public deficit is largely financed with external debt and the government mainly produces non-tradable goods.   ￿￿
 
2  The Database 
 
BC’s  empirical  work  is  based  on  a  sample  of  2644  publicly  traded  firms  in  5 
countries, including Colombia. Their sample is biased to Brazil and Mexico and in that 
publicly traded firms, the source of their sample, are generally the largest and most 
financially sophisticated ones. We use a more representative database, which covers 
an average of 8,246 firms from 1995 through 2001. These firms belong to 66 sectors of 
economic  activity  (4-digit  ISIC  classification),  and  are  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Superintendencia de Sociedades. Only commercial firms with assets of at least 20,000 
legal minimum monthly wages
5 now have to report to the Superintendencia, but the 
sample also includes smaller firms
6.  
 
Firms entering after 1995 or leaving before 2001 because they ceased to operate 
will allow us to work with an unbalanced panel. We modified the data set in several 
ways as explained in Appendix 1. Table 1 includes the number of firms per year and 
sector that survived our filtering criteria (1 to 4, see Appendix 1).  
Table 1. Firms per Sector 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿  !!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   !￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
$ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
"&"￿’ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿((￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿"￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿!￿& ￿’ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ %  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿
￿
Table 2 shows that, on average, total liabilities (variables are defined in Appendix 1) are 
close to 48% of total assets at the beginning of the period, and nearly 42% by the end. 
The decrease in leverage occurs in the beginning of the period, from 1995 to 1998. The 
median value of leverage is close to the average. Apparently, firms have moved to more 
“conservative” indebtedness, although a few still have liabilities that are as large as their 







                                                 
5 The current minimum monthly wage is US$110. Hence, only  firms with assets above US$2 million are subject to mandatory 
reporting. 
6  Due  to  procedural  changes—the  Superintendencia  now  differentiates  between  inspected  (inspeccionadas)  and  supervised 
(vigiladas) firms—there was a non-negligible decrease in the number of firms in 2001. Until 2000 all firms had to report their financial 
statements. Starting in 2001 only (larger) vigiladas have to do so.   ￿￿
￿
Table 2. Firm Leverage, descriptive statistics  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿* ￿+￿ % * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ,
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
The breakdown of liabilities by currency denomination, maturity, and financial vs. trade-
related debt for the year 2000 is presented in Table 3
7. Firms hold a large proportion of 
short-term  debt  (i.e.  of  less  than  one  year).  This  is  consistent  with  the  available 
evidence  on  firms’  financial  opportunities  in  Colombia,  where  internal  resources  are 
often the source of funding for investment, whereas debt is a source of working capital. 
The share of foreign or “dollar” debt
8 is low on average and most firms hold no foreign 
currency denominated liabilities. Nonetheless, a few hold a high share. The median firm 
holds its entire domestic and dollar debt in the form of short-term debt for all years. 
Also, the proportion of short-term debt is higher on average for dollar debt. This has to 
do with the fact that a very important component of foreign debt is actually debt with 
foreign suppliers. If only financial dollar debt is considered (tables not shown), short-
term dollar debt is actually close to 50% of total dollar debt on average.  
 
About 26% of the firms in our sample hold a positive amount of dollar debt (Table 4) and 
those firms hold on average approximately 20% of their liabilities in dollars. The share of 
firms  indebted  abroad  and,  more  surprisingly,  their  average  indebtedness  does  not 
change much, despite the recent devaluation. The only exception is 2001 when, due to 
changes in the sample, the share of firms indebted abroad rises to nearly 33% of the 
entire sample. It seems that although larger firms that are vigiladas are more frequently 








                                                 
7 Yearly information is available upon request.  Ratios vary little through time.    
8  It  should  be  noted  that  all  foreign  currency  denominated  debt  is  with  overseas  creditors,  as  Colombian  domestic  financial 
institutions are not allowed to denominate loans in dollars.  Total dollar debt includes debt with foreign suppliers, whereas non-trade 
dollar debt refers to debt with banks and financial corporations overseas. We are not able to identify whether or not foreign debt is 
acquired with a parent firm abroad.  
9 The previous figures correspond to total dollar debt, which is largely composed of trade-related debt. When only financial dollar 
debt is considered (tables not shown) the average share of dollar debt in the entire sample is much smaller, close to 2%. Also, the 
proportion of firms holding dollar debt that is not trade-related is significantly lower, 8-10% of the sample.    ￿￿
 
Table 3. Debt Maturity, Denomination and Financial vs. Trade-related Debt 
Descriptive statistics for 2000 ( %) 
-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ * ￿+￿ % * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ,
/￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿1 "  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ *￿+￿ ￿ ￿ , (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿
(￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ , (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿
-￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ , (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿
.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿1 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿# # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2
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  Turning to the revenue side, most firms do not export, although a few export their 
entire output (Table 5). The average share of income generated abroad, while still low, 
has increased through time. Regarding the currency composition of inputs, we rely on 
sectoral data on imported inputs for estimation purposes, using the most disaggregated 
information available from the economy’s input-output matrix. For most sectors imported 
input shares do not change much through time, though there is significant heterogeneity 
in terms of import orientation and its evolution by sector. When examined by sector, 
exports are important for firms in agriculture, manufacturing, and mining, although most 
firms do not export at all, regardless of which sector they are in. On the other hand, 
several sectors seem to be affected by the cost of inputs channel (Figure 1). Foreign 
debt is also important for a number of sectors. In particular, the electricity, gas and   ￿￿
water sector (made up of a few and large firms) is highly indebted in dollars. This sector 
is also a net importer. Transportation and Commerce are in a similar situation (Figure 
2). 
 
Table 5. Composition of Output in Terms of Currencies 
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The rate of investment in fixed capital- defined as net purchases of property, plant and 
equipment as percent of total assets-decreased sharply from 1996 to 1997 and slightly 
thereafter reaching its lowest level in 1999; a mild recovery is observed since.  
 
We now turn to a description of the main correlates of firms’ characteristics. In 
Figure 3 we identify each firm as belonging to one of three zones in the foreign debt-
exports space: hell, heaven, and hedge. Firms are hedged when facing an exchange 
rate devaluation when the share of their output that is denominated in foreign currency 
is “similar” to their share of foreign denominated liabilities. Arbitrarily, we set the upper 
and lower bounds of the hedge area in the lines share of foreign debt=(3/2)*share of 
exports and share of foreign debt=(2/3)*share of exports, respectively
10. Firms are in 
hell when their share of foreign debt is significantly larger than their share of exports. In 
the opposite extreme, firms in heaven have a larger proportion of their output in dollars 
as compared to their share of dollar debt
11. The distribution of firms and the average 
value  of  assets  for  firms  in  each  zone  is  presented  for  2000  only,  as  it  varies  little 
through time. Only financial dollar debt is taken into account in Figure 3. Most of the 
firms in our sample belong to the hedge zone (78.77%), largely because many firms do 
not  have  foreign  debt  nor  export.  Firms  in  Heaven  follow  in  importance  (17.17%), 
whereas a smaller proportion of firms (4.05%) are in hell. In terms of size firms in hell 
are the largest on average, whereas those in hedge are the smallest. ￿
￿
￿
                                                 
10 It must be pointed out that these bounds are chosen arbitrarily because of their geometrical appeal: they imply that the hell, 
heaven and hedge areas are of the same size. We  experimented with alternative definitions of these areas, and results are very 
similar. Furthermore, we considered an alternative zone classification in the net  exports-foreign debt space; a firm might actually 
find itself in “hell squared” during a devaluation if it has negative net exports besides from holding a large share of foreign debt.      
11 Obviously, firms in Heaven are actually in Hell as a result of a real exchange rate appreciation. Also, the definition of hedging 
considered here is quite limited in scope, as it has to do with the extent of mismatch between the currency composition of output 
and liabilities. In our data set we are unable to observe whether firms use financial instruments such as derivatives or forwards to 
hedge their foreign indebtedness.   ￿￿
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Interestingly, fixed capital investment falls precipitously for firms in every zone at the 
beginning in 1997. The ones in hedge heavily decrease their rate of investment but with 
those in heaven are able to recover. Firms in hell, on the other hand, experience a 
steady decline in their average level (Figure 4).  
 
  Finally,  a  natural  alternative  to  determine  whether  our  sample  of  firms  is 
sufficiently representative within the Colombian economy would be to compare the level 
of  investment  undertaken  by  our  sample  of  firms  with  national  accounts  data  for 
investment at the corporate level. Since our investment figures come from cash flow 
data  (see  Appendix  2),  they  are  not  directly  comparable  to  national  accounts  data. 
Nonetheless,  a  suggestive  figure  refers  to  non-traditional  exports.  Once  we  exclude 
firms in the coffee, coal, and oil sectors, exports of firms in our sample amount to 74%   ￿￿￿
of total non-traditional exports in the national accounts. Likewise, total dollar debt of 
firms in our sample accounts for approximately three fourths of foreign debt acquired by 
the non-financial private sector, as reported by the Central Bank.  
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3  Analytical framework for the firm-level analysis  
 
In section 4.2 we will closely follow BC’s empirical strategy. Thus, before turning to the 
empirical analysis, it is useful to consider the basic intuition behind BC’s model of the 
impact of exchange rate movements for firm level investment and its variation across 
firms  with  different  levels  of  dollarization  of  liabilities  (the  model,  with  two  simple 
extensions,  is  summarized  in  Appendix  3).  In  addition  to  the  usual  expansionary  or 
“competitiveness” effect of devaluations, they consider the fact that for dollar-indebted 
firms devaluations might lead to a decrease in “net worth” due to a currency “mismatch” 
between liabilities and income. This deterioration in balance sheets makes firms appear 
as riskier investments. As a result, they face higher interest rates, which bring about a 
decline in investment. ￿
￿
BC’s model can be easily extended in two directions, discussed by the authors 
but not incorporated in their model. First, firms might use imported inputs, challenging 
the  fact  that  the  “competitiveness”  effect  of  a  devaluation  is  necessarily  positive. 
Second, firms pay an interest rate that depends not only on their own net worth, but also 
on the macroeconomic environment. In particular, quitting the “dogged” defense of the 
currency allows the domestic interest rate to decrease, fostering investment of firms 
indebted in pesos. Thus, in attempting to evaluate empirically the effect of a devaluation 
on firm investment across different levels of dollar indebtedness, it is important to take   ￿￿￿
into account both the extent to which firms tend to import their inputs and domestic 
credit conditions. For these reasons, in our empirical analysis we explicitly control for 
the  tradability  of firms  output  and  inputs  and  their  interaction  with  foreign  exchange 




4  Estimation and results 
 
4.1  Currency composition of debt 
 
BC argue that firms holding dollar debt invest more than firms holding peso debt in the 
period following a devaluation because they match the currency composition of debt 
with the elasticity of their income to the real exchange rate. Under this interpretation, 
dollarization of liabilities should be higher in firms that could be expected to benefit from 
a  devaluation.  Lending  support  to  this  hypothesis,  BC  report  the  results  of  a  set  of 
simple regressions where the ratio of dollar debt to total liabilities is a (positive) function 
of several proxies for the sensitivity of profits to the real exchange rate. We start our 
empirical investigation examining whether this result holds in our data.   
 
In Table 6 we consider a set of alternative specifications for the determinants of 
non-trade related dollar debt
12. We are interested in knowing whether larger firms and 
with more tradable output have more access to external credit. Additionally, a number of 
authors  have  found  that  firms  with  international  operations  are  more  likely  to  hold 
foreign debt. In our data set the information on whether a firm is a parent or subsidiary 
is unreliable, so we include the share of foreign ownership in each firm
13.  
 
The results presented in Table 6 show that foreign debt is positively correlated 
with firms´ size (i.e. the log of the value of its assets). In the first column, a simple 
random effects panel data estimation reveals that firms with foreign ownership have a 
(marginally significant) higher share of dollar debt to total debt, and the time dummies 
indicate a negative trend in the share of financial dollar debt. In this equation, belonging 
to  a  relatively  open  sector  (agriculture,  mining  or  manufacturing)  is  not  a  significant 








                                                 
12 We also run regressions for the share of total dollar debt, to check the sensitivity of the results. There are only two significant 
changes. First, and not surprisingly, there is a positive correlation between imports and the total share of dollar debt. Second, the 
somewhat negative time trend that we report below for financial dollar debt does not hold for total dollar debt.  
13 Perhaps the most important determinant of the extent of dollar indebtedness is the interest rate differential that each firm faces 
when considering different financing options. Since we are working with low frequency data, it is difficult to find a reliable measure of 
such differential.   ￿￿￿
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Random effects 
GLS Tobit Probit Fixed Effects Tobit Probit
Independent variables
Openness Dummy -0.0069 9.072*** 0.4170***
(0.17) (1.27) (0.06)
Exports 0.00856** 0.132*** 0.0071***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Imports -0.115 0.4204 0.0168
(0.09) (0.44) (0.03)
Log (Assets) 0.996*** 14.221*** 0.628*** 0.873*** 12.31*** 0.5665***
(0.05) (0.46) (0.02) (0.10) (0.53) (0.03)
Foreign participation  0.003** 0.0281** 0.00117** 0.0023 0.0385*** 0.00176**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
1996 0.174* 2.386** 0.1544** 0.1755 2.267* 0.154**
(0.10) (1.05) (0.05) (0.13) (1.18) (0.06)
1997 -0.022 -0.724 0.02 -0.0862 -2.152* -0.062
(0.10) (1.06) (0.05) (0.13) (1.20) (0.06)
1998 -0.0698 -2.043** -0.054 -0.1356 -3.10** -0.1158***
(0.10) (1.06) (0.05) (0.13) (1.20) (0.06)
1999 -0.241** -4.839*** -0.194*** -0.4224 -5.93*** -0.221***
(0.10) (1.12) (0.05) (0.14) (1.27) (0.06)
2000 -0.515*** -8.147*** -0.327*** -0.758*** -9.898*** -0.399**
(0.10) (1.15) (0.06) (0.14) (1.31) (0.07)
2001 -0.890*** -9.076*** -0.3528*** -1.061*** -10.296*** -0.408***
(0.12) (1.23) (0.06) (0.16) (1.38) (0.07)
Constant -12.838*** -284.32*** -12.567*** -10.952*** -245.13*** -11.285***
(0.71) (7.62) (0.38) (1.48) (8.54) (0.42)
No of observations 45179 45179 45179 27681 27681 27681
No of firms 7567 7567 7567 4567 4567 4567
Wald or F Joint sign Test 578.08 [0.00] 20.97 [0.00]
R-square 0.0347 0.0497
Likelihood Ratio test 1204.98 [0.00] 2409.91 [0.00] 818.1 [0.00] 1319.31 [0.00]
Pseudo R-square 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.07
Dependent Variable: Non-trade Foreign Debt to Total Debt 
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This regression is nonetheless  problematic since conventional estimators are biased 
and inconsistent in the context of limited dependent variables
14. Thus, in the second 
column  we  report  estimates  of  a  Tobit  model.  Besides  from  the  extent  of  dollar 
indebtedness, we are interested in the determinants of whether or not to acquire debt in 
dollars. Thus, a Probit model for the likelihood of holding dollar debt is presented in 
column 3. Results for size, foreign participation, and the time dummies are qualitatively 
                                                 
14 In particular, since the dependent variable is truncated, the appropriate distribution of the error term must take this issue into 
account. Maximum likelihood procedures, whereby a log-likelihood function having a component for those observations that are 
“uncensored” and those that are “censored” is maximized, can be applied in this context to obtain consistent estimators.    ￿￿￿
unchanged. More importantly, there is a positive and significant coefficient attached to 
the  openness  dummy  in  the  Tobit  and  Probit  estimations
15.  These  results  provide 
evidence of matching of liabilities and income streams.
16 This negative trend implies 
that  firms  were  able  to  reduce  their  share  of  foreign  debt  holdings  at  a  rate  that 
exceeded  the  devaluation  rate.  Notice  that  the  time  effects  are  negative  from  1999 
onwards, coinciding with the floating of the currency, probably suggesting that firms took 
exchange rate risk more seriously once the exchange rate band was abandoned.  
 
In the three final columns, we drop the openness dummy and consider instead 
firms´ exports and imports as dependent variables. Initially, we run a regression where 
we control for firm specific effects and obtain a positive effect for exports and size. As 
before, this regression can be criticized on the grounds that the dependent variable lies 
between zero and one. Our Tobit and Probit
17 regressions show that exports, size and 
foreign  participation  are  a  significant  and  positive  determinant  of  the  existence  and 
extent of foreign indebtedness.
18 The time dummies again show a downward trend.  
 
  In sum, our results suggest that matching does seem to take place to the extent 
that firms in more open sectors and exporting firms are engaged more often in foreign 
indebtedness and have higher shares of dollar debt. In this regard, it is also interesting 
that financial dollar debt has a downward trend during the devaluation period and that 
imports do no exert a significant effect on financial dollar debt. Finally, size is the most 
robust determinant of dollar indebtedness, whereas there is somewhat weaker evidence 
that the degree of foreign ownership increases dollar debt
19.   
 
4.2  Firm performance 
 
We begin by presenting some regressions for firm investment as a function of the “zone 
dummies” in Figure 3. The “zone dummy” is assigned a value of -1 for firms in heaven, 
0 for firms in hedge, and 1 for firms in hell. A negative coefficient for this dummy would 
indicate that firms in heaven tend to perform better than hedged firms, which in turn 
perform better than those in hell. Indeed, this is the result we observe in the first column 
of Table 7, yet the coefficient is not significant. Sectoral GDP growth has a positive 
effect on firm performance,  whereas lagged leverage is not significant
20. Finally, the 
Wald Test for overall significance of the regressors shows that this regression has low 
explanatory power. Thus, in the second and third column we repeat the exercise for the 
periods  before  and  after  1999  (with  1999  onwards  being  the  period  of  floating  and 
sharpest  real  depreciation).  Interestingly,  we  obtain  a  large  and  significant  negative 
                                                 
15 A drawback from the previous estimations is that in our sample there is a substantial number of firms holding no dollar debt. Thus, 
in regressions, inference is drawn from the difference between a very small share of firms as compared to the majority of firms 
holding no dollar debt. There is no simple way to deal with this issue.  
16 Similar results are obtained if the degree of sectoral openness is defined as the ratio of sectoral exports plus imports to total 
sectoral production.     
17 Logistic regressions were also performed and results were very similar. 
18 For all estimations we report (and fail to accept) Likelihood Ratio and Wald tests for the joint lack of significance of the regressors. 
19  Indeed, besides from showing up with  lower significance levels, the coefficient attached to this variable turns  out not to  be 
significant when outliers (in terms of investment) are dropped from the estimations in unreported results. 
20 The sign of this latter coefficient is undetermined a priori, as a high level of leverage could increase financial constraints and debt 
payments could reduce the amount of internal funds available for investment, yet a positive coefficient might arise from the fact that 
only firms that have access to credit are able to invest.   ￿￿￿
coefficient for the latter period
21. Furthermore, the regression significantly improves its 
overall fit after 1999,  indicating that the  zone classification was a better predictor of 
performance during the strong depreciation period. Sectoral GDP growth is no longer 
significant in each sub-period and, quite interestingly, lagged leverage changes sign 
across  sub-periods.  Apparently,  in  the  latter  period  the  financial  constraint  effect 
dominated the overall sign attached to this variable.  
 
Table 7. Zone-Performance Regressions 
whole sample before 1999 from 1999 whole sample before 1999 from 1999
Independent variables
Zone Dummy -0.2104 -0.494 -0.6425*** -1.91** -0.7438 -5.217**
(0.780) (1.182) (0.284) (0.804) (1.031) (1.040)
Sectoral GDP 0.0634*** 0.084 0.0104 0.153** 0.024 0.2181**
(0.038) (0.094) (0.011) (0.036) (0.075) (0.041)
Leverage (-1) 0.017 0.0459*** -0.0316*** -0.01627 -0.0185 0.0324**
(0.014) (0.020) (0.005) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant 0.4235 -0.4957 1.969*** 4.776** 5.312** 2.847**
(0.781) (1.085) (0.273) (0.856) (0.965) (0.995)
Observations 37612 19607 18005 37612 19607 18005
Firms 7567 7217 7125 7567 7217 7125
R-square 0.0002 0.0004 0.0015 0.0002 0.0004 0.0015
Wald Test 4.27 [0.2339] 5.59 [0.1333] 42.52 [0] 24.92 [0] 1.8 [0.6143] 60.22 [0]
Dependent Variable
Fixed capital investment Profits
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In  the  last  three  columns  of  Table  7,  we  present  additional  Zone-Performance 
regressions with profits (relative to total assets) as the performance variable
22. The first 
column shows that there is on average a negative effect of the zone dummy on firm 
profitability throughout the whole period. More interestingly, there is no effect from the 
zone-dummy  prior to  the strong devaluation period  and  a negative effect from 1999 
onwards, and the difference in the coefficients between the two periods is significant. In 
unreported  regressions  we  interacted  the  zone  dummy  variable  with  a  year  specific 
dummy  for  the  period  following  the  1999  depreciation,  obtaining  a  negative  and 
significant coefficient for the interaction. Regarding controls, sectoral GDP growth has a 
positive effect on firm performance and lagged leverage has a positive effect on firm 
performance  as  measured  by  profitability  during  the  late  period.  A  final  point  worth 
                                                 
21 We also performed regressions in which we interacted the zone dummy variable with year specific dummies for the period 
following the 1999 depreciation obtaining negative coefficients for such interaction, thus confirming that firms in hell tended to 
perform worse during the devaluation period. 
22  Other  left  hand  side  variables  considered  in  unreported  regressions  included  sales  to  assets  and  cash  flow  to  assets. We 
consistently find the same overall message: hedged firms and firms in heaven tend to perform better than firms in hell, and usually 
more so starting in 1999.   ￿￿￿
mentioning is  the fact  that,  once  again,  these  regressions  significantly  improve  their 
overall fit after 1999.  
 
We interpret these results as suggesting the presence of a negative balance sheet 
effect for firms that produce non-tradables and are indebted abroad. Below we control 
for  a  number  of  additional  characteristics  and  employ  more  adequate  estimation 
methods to analyze this issue more carefully. Before doing so, however, it is important 
to mention that the above results tend to contradict BC’s finding of a positive effect on 
investment of holding dollar debt during devaluations. To confirm that these opposing 
results stem from differences in the data set employed rather than from the specification 
considered, we perform alternative versions of BC’s regressions for our sample.  We 
estimate
23 the following investment equation:  
￿








where,  it I  is the rate of fixed capital investment at time t for firm i, with investment in 
property, plant and equipment normalized by total assets. The main effect that we want 
to capture is the interaction between the inflation-adjusted devaluation of the bilateral 
exchange rate (with the U.S.,  BSt e ), and dollar debt at the beginning of t, BSt t i e D D ´ -
*
1 , . 
Two alternative definitions of 
*
1 , - t i D  are considered: the ratio of lagged dollar debt to total 
assets and to total debt for firm i.  Since foreign debt is presumably denominated in 
dollars,  to  capture  the  “balance  sheet  effect”  we  define  exchange  rate, BSt e   as  the 
nominal  bilateral  exchange  rate  with  the  U.S.  adjusted  by  domestic  inflation.  By 
interacting the (log) percentage change in this real exchange rate index with the share 
of foreign debt, we capture the differential effect that real exchange rate devaluation has 
on  investment  for  firms  with  varying  degrees  of  foreign  debt  exposure
24.  The 
specifications consider firm fixed effects. In (1) we define  t i i m b b + = 1   as the intercept 
for the ith firm with  b  as the mean intercept and  i m  the difference from this mean for 
the ith firm.  An additional set of regressors, including firms’ leverage and sectoral GDP 
growth, are summarized by  t i X , . 
 
Alternative specifications are reported in Table 8.
25 The first point that should be 
highlighted is that the direct effect of the real exchange rate depreciation is consistently 
negative  and  significant  (columns  1  and  3),  whereas  the  interaction  of  the  bilateral 
devaluation with dollar debt is negative but not significant
26. In other words, the effect of 
the  variation  in  the  exchange  rate  is  negative  for  all  firms  irrespective  of  the 
                                                 
23 Estimations undertaken using DPD for OX developed by Manuel Arellano, Stephen Bond and Jurgen A. Doornik.  
24 We performed estimations for end of period and average percentage change of BSt e .  To ease reading, we shall present results 
with the latter measure, noting which results change when end-of-period depreciation is considered instead.  
25 Results presented in Table 8 and in tables below consider only non-trade dollar debt. Regressions including total dollar debt were 
also run, and some of the results are reported below. 
26  Whereas  dollar  debt  is  interacted  with  the  bilateral  real  exchange  rate  (BRER)  devaluation,  when  devaluation  enters 
independently it is measured by the effective (multilateral) real exchange rate (RER) devaluation. When the BRER depreciation is 
included instead, the resulting direct effect is still negative and actually larger.    ￿￿￿
denomination of their debt, and dollar indebted firms do not fare any better (as they do 
in BC’s sample).   
 
  If  firms  attempt  to  match  their  revenue  and  expense  streams,  the  currency 
composition of debt might be correlated with a number of additional firm characteristics, 
such as the currency denomination of their revenue and inputs. Thus, in columns 2 and 
4 we directly control for the degree of tradability of the firms’ output and inputs
27.  In 
these  regressions,  the  direct  effect  of  the  devaluation  is  still  negative  though  not 
significant,  and  its  interaction  with  the  degree  of  foreign  indebtedness  remains 
insignificant. We  do  find  evidence,  however,  that  exports,  when  interacted  with  real 
exchange rate devaluation, have a positive impact on investment. Other controls, such 
as the non-interacted degree of dollar indebtedness, overall leverage, share of exports 
and  share  of  imports,  are  generally  not  significant.  The  only  exception  refers  to the 
share  of  dollar  debt  to  total  assets  exerting  a  negative  effect  on  investment  when 
tradability  terms  are  excluded.    Likewise,  sectoral  GDP  growth  does  not  have  a 
significant effect on investment in any of the specifications
28.  
 
In short, these results, which replicate in our sample the estimation undertaken by BC 
for some publicly traded Latin American corporations, indicate that there is evidence of 
a  negative  effect  on  investment  of  devaluations  and  that  foreign  indebtedness  (if 
anything) makes matters worse.  
 
Although these estimations are suggestive, they have serious limitations. First, the only 
robust  result  refers  to  devaluations  having  a  negative  effect  on  investment
29. 
Nonetheless, the interpretation of this coefficient is unclear. Actually, putting too much 
emphasis on any coefficient attached to macro variables is problematic because these 
variables only change through time, and are likely to be correlated with omitted macro 
variables that could be captured in a year-specific component of the error term. Thus, 
the  coefficient  attached  to  macro  variables  may  be  inconsistent.  For  instance,  the 
negative coefficient of the devaluation term could actually proxy for a loss in consumer 
confidence. On more technical grounds, a major drawback of the estimations reported 
thus far is that, although the within estimator eliminates the inconsistency arising from 
the  fact  that  firm-specific  effects  might  be  correlated  with  the  set  of  independent 
variables, it does not account for the fact that most right hand side variables might be 
endogenous. Also, one might be interested in allowing the investment regressions to 
have a dynamic structure. 
                                                 
27 There might be a chance for measurement error in the export and import variables if firms do not export/import directly but rather 
through an intermediary. As explained above, imported inputs data is imputed from sectoral data but we do rely on balance sheet 
data on exports for our baseline estimations. When these tradability terms are included, our sample is reduced substantially, as we 
cannot impute reasonable shares of imports to all of the firms in the sample.  
28 None of these results are sensitive to the definition of the bilateral exchange rate devaluation (end of period vs. average) nor to 
the inclusion of total dollar debt instead of non-trade dollar debt. Most importantly, the interaction of dollar debt with the devaluation 
term is rarely significant, and when it enters significantly it has a negative effect. Some results do change, however, when outliers 
are  excluded.  In  that  case,  the  negative  effect  of  the  devaluation  term  is much more robust  to  the  specification  and  variable 
definition. Also, the interaction of the devaluation with exports is no longer significant, whereas its interaction with the share of 
imports is significantly negative, as expected. 
29 This result is not only robust under BC’s specification, but under a number of additional specifications in which additional macro 
and firm-level variables (such as the interest rate, the maturity of indebtedness, the tradability of output and the import component of 
inputs) were considered, as well as in a number of regressions were different estimation methods were employed.    ￿￿￿
Table 8. Fixed Capital Investment Regressions (BC) 
Non-Trade Dollar Debt 
DIRECT EFFECTS
∆ Log (exchange rate) -0.229*** -0.418 -0.232*** -0.42
(0.083) (0.327) (0.083) (0.329)
INTERACTIONS
∆ Log (bilateral US "RER") x Dollar Debt (-1) -0.266 0.201 -0.065 0.1436
(0.318) (0.293) (0.149) (0.188)
∆ Log (real exchange rate) x Exports (-1) 0.0035** 0.0035**
(0.002) (0.002)
∆ Log (real exchange rate) x Imports (-1) 0.0046 0.0046
(0.006) (0.006)
CONTROLS
Dollar Debt (-1) -0.0919* -0.0285 -0.034 0.005
(0.051) (0.045) (0.024) (0.026)
Leverage (-1) -0.011 -0.0096 -0.0127 -0.0113
(0.019) (0.042) (0.019) (0.041)
Exports (-1) -0.008 -0.0086
(0.008) (0.008)
Imports (-1) -0.473 -0.472
(0.417) (0.417)
Sectoral gdp growth -0.024 -0.0379 -0.025 -0.0378
(0.039) (0.077) (0.039) (0.077)
R^2 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Observations 37512 17704 37512 17704
Firms 7567 3976 7567 3976
Wald Test 49.58 [0.000] ** 106.9 [0.000] ** 50.34 [0.000] ** 102.8 [0.000] **
Dependent Variable: Fixed Capital Investment
dollar debt to total assets dollar debt to total debt
￿
:￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2￿ ￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 8# ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿?￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ @ ￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿; ￿< ￿
￿$ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=￿￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=￿
￿
 A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator based on the use of lagged 
observations of the dependent and explanatory variables allows us to deal with these 
problems  (Arellano  and  Bover,  1995).  To  address  the  problem  of  possible  omitted 
variable bias induced by firm specific effects, the regression equation is differenced. 
Also, to address the problem of joint endogeneity, suitably lagged values of the original 
(i.e.  in  levels)  independent  variables,  including  the  lagged  value  of  the  dependent 
variable, are used as instruments for the right hand side variables (i.e. the differenced 
values  of  the  original  regressors)  in  the  transformed  equation.  The  validity  of  the 
moment conditions implicit in this “GMM difference estimator” are tested statistically.  
First, we present results for a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions that checks the 
overall validity of these moment conditions. Under the maintained assumption that the   ￿￿￿
error  term  of  the  original  dynamic  levels  equation  is  serially  uncorrelated,  the 
transformed error term for the difference equation is expected to have serial correlation 
of first order, but not of second order. Thus we report AR(1) and AR(2) tests on the lack 
of  serial  correlation  for  the  transformed  error  term
30.  These  test  statistics  are 
asymptotically normal under the null of no serial correlation. 
 
A  drawback  of  the  first  differenced  GMM  estimator  is  that  the  instruments 
available for the transformed regression equation are weak when the individual series 
have  near  unit  root  properties.  Indeed,  if  the  series  are  highly  persistent,  their 
differences are nearly innovations and there are no good instruments for near white 
noise  series.  Thus,  the  GMM  difference  estimator  can  be  subject  to  finite  sample 
biases. This potential bias can be reduced using the “GMM system estimator” proposed 
by  Arellano  and  Bover.  This  estimator  combines  the  regression  expressed  in  first 
differences with the original equation expressed in levels. As before, suitably lagged 
values of the dependent variables in levels are used as instruments for the differenced 
equation, whereas the equation in levels is instrumented with lagged differences of the 
explanatory variables. Both the Sargan and serial correlation tests are examined in this 
case.  A  Difference  Sargan  Test  is  useful  in  this  context,  since  the  set  of  moment 
conditions  specified  under  the  simple  difference  estimator  is  a  subset  of  the  one 
considered  in  the  system  estimator.  The  difference  between  the  Sargan  statistic 
obtained  under  the  system  estimator  and  the  one  obtained  under  the  difference 
estimator  is  asymptotically  distributed 
2 c   with  degrees  of  freedom  given  by  the 
difference between the number of degrees of freedom of the system estimator and that 
of  the  difference  estimator.  Failure  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  the  validity  of 
additional restrictions gives support to the system estimator
31.￿
￿
Taking  the  former  considerations  into  account,  we  estimate  alternative 
specifications in which we drop the non-interacted macro variables and include year 
specific effects to capture the overall macroeconomic environment affecting our sample 
of firms. We concentrate our attention on the role of firm specific variables and, perhaps 
more  importantly,  their  interaction  with  macroeconomic  variables.  In  unreported 
regressions we considered a version of BC’s specification for fixed capital investment 
where,  besides  from  the  key  interaction  term  and  time-specific  effects,  only  lagged 
leverage and the lagged ratio of dollar indebtedness to assets are included as additional 
regressors. In sum, despite the suggestive evidence presented in Table 7 regarding the 
performance of firms in “hell” as opposed to hedged  and  in heaven, results from these 
regressions (as those from Table 8) indicate that it is difficult to find a significant degree 
of heterogeneity in firm response to exchange rate movements depending on their level 
                                                 
30 One may allow for the error term of the original levels equation to follow an autoregressive process of finite order, as long as there 
are enough time series to estimate the parameters.  For example, if the original error term is MA(1), the differenced error term is 
MA(2) and only lags of the dependent variables dated t-2 are available as instruments for the differenced equation. See Bond (2002) 
for an intuitive review on this and other issues concerning GMM estimators for dynamic panel data models.   
31 The Difference Sargan Test is also useful in determining the lags available for instrumenting right hand side variables. Indeed, 
when right hand side variables are endogenous—correlated with present and past variables of the regression disturbance—lags 
dated t-2 and onwards are available as valid instruments. If these variables are predetermined—correlated with past variables of the 
regression disturbance— then lags dated t-1 also become available and if the variable is strictly exogenous then current values 
(dated t) are also available as valid instruments. In all specifications below, firm-specific characteristics are lagged one period, so we 
usually assumed that these variables are predetermined. Nonetheless, when more than one specification was valid according to 
Sargan tests, we relied on the Difference Sargan Test to choose the preferred specification.    ￿￿￿
of foreign indebtedness. This is probably not surprising considering the limited degree of 
foreign indebtedness of Colombian firms. These results are nonetheless important to 
the extent that they reveal that BC’s result is unlikely to hold in our sample of firms (i.e. 
dollar indebted firms do NOT fare any better during devaluations)
32.    
 
Moving away from BC’s framework, in Tables 9 to 11 we consider an alternative 
set of regressions were we control for potentially relevant omitted factors and examine, 
together  with  the  behavior  of  investment,  the  response  of  profits  as  an  alternative 
performance measure. We include the interaction between dollar debt at the end of t-1 
and alternative channels for the real exchange rate
33, and interactions of exchange rate 
terms  with  lagged  exports  and  imports.  As  noted  in  Section  3,  we  might  see  firms 
investing  more  after  a  devaluation  not  because  individually  they  benefit  from  a 
“competitiveness  effect”  but  because  collectively  this  allowed  for  a  looser  monetary 
policy.  Likewise,  we  could  see  them  investing  less  not  because  of  a  balance  sheet 
effect of dollar indebtedness but because they face higher interest rates under a dogged 
defense  of  the  currency.  Since  this  would  most  likely  affect  firms  that  are  indebted 
domestically in the short run, we include interest  rate terms interacted with different 
measures  of  indebtedness.  In  this  set  of  regressions,  time-specific  effect  are  also 
included. 
 
Although we present results for only one measure of dollar debt and exports, 
results do not change when alternative definitions are included
34. We estimate static 
fixed effects specifications as well as dynamic GMM estimations
35. Regarding the latter, 
Sargan  and  AR  tests performed  satisfactorily  and  the  additional moment  restrictions 
implied by the GMM System estimator were not rejected. Thus, we present both the 
GMM Difference and System estimations
36. Our sample is significantly reduced as we 
are not able to impute reliable measures of imported inputs to all firms in our sample.  
  
Table 9 presents a set of estimations for the case in which firm level variables are 
interacted  with  measures  for  the  changes  in  the  macro  variables  (i.e.  dollar  debt, 
exports, and imports are interacted with the real exchange rate devaluation, whereas 
                                                 
32 Since BC argue that their result is driven by the fact that dollar indebted firms see their sales and earnings rise after a devaluation, 
we also employed the same framework used for investment to examine the effects of a devaluation on earnings and sales. Results 
actually lent some evidence to the fact that dollar indebted firms experienced a decline rather than an upsurge in cash flow and 
sales during devaluation when compared to peso-indebted firms. Estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
33 In the case of fixed capital investment regressions, we interacted firm level variables both with the changes in macro variables and 
with their levels. The latter specification could be motivated by an accelerationist approach (see Bond et. al., 1997) whereby the 
desired level of capital depends, for instance, on the level of the exchange and interest rates so that the ratio of investment to total 
assets (a proxy for the rate of growth of capital) depends on the devaluations rate and the rate of change of the interest rate. On the 
other hand, interaction with levels captures to what extent investment (or profits)  change as a result of shifts in, say, the real 
exchange rate.  
34 The exchange rate devaluation refers to average devaluation of the bilateral real exchange rate, short term debt is the share of 
short term domestic debt, and exports are obtained at the level of the firm. In the case of exports and imports, interactions of a 
multilateral real exchange rate is considered instead. Regressions were run for end of period depreciation, the overall share of short 
term indebtedness and for sectoral data on exports. Results were mostly unchanged.  
35 Estimating dynamic specifications with the OLS and within estimators is useful, since the former is usually biased upwards and 
the latter downwards. For all reported estimations, we run OLS and fixed effects regressions to check that our GMM estimators, 
presumably  consistent,  lied  between  the  two.    The  difference  in  the  estimators  were  often  large,  suggesting  the  presence  of 
significant firm-specific effects 
36 Two step estimates with robust standard errors are presented. Second-step standard errors were computed using Windmeijer’s 
(2000) finite-sample correction.  It should also be noted that we instrument for the level of foreign debt, leverage, exports, and the 
maturity composition of debt. Also, although we run regressions using all available lags as instruments, we only report those in 
which three lags were used.    ￿￿￿
the degree of short term indebtedness is interacted with the (log) percentage change of 
the real interest lending rate). The most salient feature of these regressions is that we 
fail to find any significant heterogeneity in terms of the response of firms to exchange 
and  interest  rate  movements.  Actually,  the  terms  included  in  our  fixed  effects 
regressions (besides from the time specific effects) are not jointly significant. In the case 
of the dynamic GMM regressions, there is clear evidence of persistence in the level of 
investment,  but  key  interactions  are  once  again  insignificant.  Only  under  the  GMM 
System regression we find a significant effect of firm level characteristics, namely, a 
positive effect of short term debt, total leverage, and share  of imports. In this case, 
sectoral GDP growth also exerts a significant positive effect on investment.  
 
When macro variables are interacted in levels as in Table 10, we are able to 
capture  somewhat  more  heterogeneity.  In  particular,  the  interaction  of  the  real 
exchange rate index with exports is positive and significant in all fixed effects and GMM 
system specifications. On the other hand, although the interaction of dollar debt and the 
real exchange rate is negative, it is not significant. Regarding non-interacted firm level 
variables, the only important change refers to the level of exports having a negative 
effect on investment under the fixed effect and system GMM regressions. As before, 
time effects are significant, and there is evidence of persistence in investment
37.  
￿
Finally,  in  Table  11  we  use  profits  (as  %  of  total  assets)  as  the  dependent 
variable, while the macro variables in the interactions enter in levels
38. Interestingly, we 
obtain a significant negative effect of the dollar debt interaction with the exchange rate. 
This  result  is  somewhat  puzzling  since  if  (as  we  have  assumed)  net  worth  affects 
investment  levels,  decreased  profits  should  imply  lower  investment
39.  There  is  also 
some evidence that exporting firms tend to have larger increases in their profits in times 
of devaluations, whereas the impact of having a higher share of imported inputs is not 
robust, though negative in the (preferred) System GMM regression. A noteworthy result 
is that there  appears to be  no  persistence in firm profitability. Regarding the role of 
additional firm level variables, results are not robust to alternative specifications.  
                                                 
37 Since a small share of firms hold non-trade related dollar debt, we also run the regressions of Tables 9 and 10 considering total 
dollar debt and its interaction with real exchange rate terms. When macroeconomic variables enter in changes, the interaction 
results hardly change, whereas in the case of level interactions the most important change refers to the interaction between dollar 
debt and the exchange rate having a negative and significant effect. 
38 Indeed, it is not straightforward to motivate, as in the case of investment, regressions that consider the rate of devaluation and the 
rate of change of the interest rate as right hand side variables resulting form an accelerationist approach. Rather, one would like to 
uncover the role of exchange rate shifts on the level of profits. 
39 When total dollar debt is considered instead of non-trade debt this result still holds.   ￿￿￿
Table 9. Detailed Fixed Capital Investment Regressions 
Fixed Effects
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable (-1) 0.054*** 0.0596***
(0.011) (0.01058)
INTERACTIONS
Bilateral US "RER" devaluation x Dollar Debt (-1) 0.0599 0.0394 0.0296
(0.067) (0.060) (0.067)
Share of Exports (-1) x RER devaluation 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Share of Imports (-1) x RER devaluation -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.00027) (0.0009) (0.001)
Real interest lending rate % change x Short Term 
Domestic Debt (-1) -0.017 0.024 -0.0026
(0.019) (0.026) (0.0262)
CONTROLS
Short Term Domestic Debt (-1) 0.0018 0.0035 0.0043**
(0.001) (0.0032) (0.0019)
Leverage (-1) -0.0004 0.038 0.0492***
(0.0038) (0.029) (0.017)
Dollar Debt (-1) -0.0016 -0.011 -0.0164
(0.0127) (0.0175) (0.0178)
Exports (-1) 0.0038 -0.0006 0.0041
(0.004) (0.008) (0.0048)
Imports (-1) -0.0034 0.0009 0.0265*
(0.0032) (0.0124) (0.015)
Sectorial Output Growth -0.0012 0.0283 0.0567**
(0.0087) (0.0243) (0.024)
TIME EFFECTS YES YES YES
Observations 15900 15900 15900
Firms 3188 3188 3188
Wald Test (joint) 12.43 [0.257] 43.79 [0.000] ** 83.21 [0.000] **
Wald Test (time) 206.6 [0.000] ** 92.99 [0.000] ** 120.4 [0.000] **
Sargan Test 47.49 [0.535] 72.31 [0.369]
Difference Sargan Test 24.82 [0.208]
AR(1) -10.05 [0.000] ** -10.06 [0.000] **
AR(2) 0.9133 [0.361] 1.067 [0.286]
GMM Difference GMM System
Dependent variable: Fixed Capital Investment
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Table 10. Detailed Fixed Capital Investment Regressions 
Fixed Effects
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable (-1) 0.052*** 0.059***
(0.011) (0.01)
INTERACTIONS
Bilateral US "RER" x Dollar Debt (-1) -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Share of Exports (-1) x RER 0.0004** 0.0004 0.0005**
-0.0002 (0.0003) (0.00026)
Share of Imports (-1) x RER -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.001
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Real interest lending rate x Short Term Domestic Debt 
(-1) -0.0003 0.000001 0.00003
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
CONTROLS
Short Term Domestic Debt (-1) 0.040 0.0032 0.007
(0.027) (0.042) (0.039)
Leverage (-1) -0.0005 0.0478 0.049***
(0.0038) (0.030) (0.016)
Dollar Debt (-1) 0.058 0.039 -0.0098
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051)
Exports (-1) -0.037* -0.033 -0.054*
(0.0225) (0.032) (0.028)
Imports (-1) 0.034 0.0547 0.142
(0.029) (0.109) (0.113)
Sectorial Output Growth -0.0015 0.0198 0.0598***
(0.0085) (0.020) (0.022)
TIME EFFECTS YES YES YES
Observations 15900 15900 15900
Firms 3188 3188 3188
Wald Test (joint) 20.74 [0.023] * 43.65 [0.000] ** 89.62 [0.000] **
Wald Test (time) 183.8 [0.000] ** 88.20 [0.000] ** 115.5 [0.000] **
Sargan Test 45.05 [0.634] 70.36 [0.432]
Difference Sargan Test 25.31 [0.190]
AR(1) -10.07 [0.000] ** -10.01 [0.000] **
AR(2) 0.8632 [0.388] 1.078 [0.281]
Dependent variable: Fixed Capital Investment
GMM Difference GMM System
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Table 11. Profits Regressions 
Fixed Effects
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable (-1) -0.296 0.026
(0.27) (0.031)
INTERACTIONS
Bilateral US "RER" x Dollar Debt (-1) -0.0189** -0.0084* -0.006*
(0.087) (0.005) (0.003)
Share of Exports (-1) x RER -0.0028 0.0035 0.0056**
(0.0033) (0.003) (0.002)
Share of Imports (-1) x RER 0.0036* -0.0073 -0.027***
(0.0019) (0.0079) (0.01)
Real interest lending rate x Short Term Domestic Debt (-1) -0.0015 0.0028 0.00004
(0.002) (0.0026) (0.002)
CONTROLS
Short Term Domestic Debt (-1) 0.268 -0.341 0.0024
(0.203) (0.291) (0.213)
Leverage (-1) 0.172 0.35 0.296**
(0.159) (0.466) (0.144)
Dollar Debt (-1) 1.209** 0.42 0.289
(0.563) (0.431) (0.239)
Exports (-1) 0.418 -0.378 -0.617**
(0.476) (0.306) (0.244)
Imports (-1) -0.452** 0.742 3.106***
(0.208) (0.878) (01.163)
Sectorial Output Growth -0.216 0.0756 0.390
(0.217) (0.133) (0.252)
TIME EFFECTS YES YES YES
Observations 15900 15900 15900
Firms 3188 3188 3188
Wald Test (joint) 28.50 [0.001] ** 14.06 [0.230] 16.05 [0.139]
Wald Test (time) 8.228 [0.144] 7.135 [0.211] 9.933 [0.128]
Sargan Test  54.5 [0.273] 79.43 [0.183]
Sargan Difference Test 24.93 [0.204]
AR(1) -0.9876 [0.323] -1.377 [0.168]
AR(2) 0.2931 [0.769] 0.8119 [0.417]
Dependent variable: Profits
GMM Difference GMM System
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In sum, this section suggests that, while there is evidence of a negative balance 
sheet effect on firms’ performance as measured by profitability, results for investment 
are mixed. On the one hand, firms that are not highly indebted in dollars and export part 
of their output tend to outperform dollar-indebted, non-exporting firms. Nonetheless, the 
interaction  of  dollar  indebtedness  with  the  exchange  rate  terms  is  generally  not 





5  Conclusions 
 
Recently, Colombia has experienced increased macroeconomic volatility. After a period 
of  significant  currency  appreciation  associated  with  large  capital  inflows  and  oil 
investments, the exchange rate experienced a strong real depreciation in response to 
capital outflows at the end of the decade (along with many emerging economies). While 
among  policy  makers  the  favorable  view  of  exchange  rate  devaluation  for  firm 
investment has prevailed, there is a recent and increasing concern in the literature for 
the possible detrimental effects of devaluations in the presence of foreign indebtedness. 
Foreign denominated currency, it is argued, leads to a negative balance sheet effect 
that constraint firms’ investment.  
 
  This  paper  contributes  to  this  debate  on  empirical  grounds.  We  examine  the 
determinants of investment for a representative sample of Colombian firms in the period 
1995-2001. Our results suggest that matching takes place, to the extent that exporting 
firms and those in more open sectors are more likely to have foreign indebtedness and 
hold  higher  shares  of  dollar  debt.  Firm  size  is  the  most  robust  and  significant 
determinant  of  dollar  indebtedness.  Although  the  previous  results  and  the  limited 
amount of dollar denominated indebtedness in Colombia tilt the balance against finding 
any negative balance sheet effect of devaluations, we find evidence in favour of the 
latter on firms’ performance as measured by profitability. Results for investment, on the 
other hand, are mixed. Although firms that are not highly indebted in dollars and export 
part  of their  output  tended  to outperform  the  rest during  the  devaluation  period, the 
interaction of dollar indebtedness with the exchange rate is generally not significant in 
our investment regressions.  
￿
￿ In sum, as it is shown in Table 12, there is evidence of matching in Colombian 
firms;  yet,  against  BC,  dollar  indebted  firms  not  necessarily  fare  better  during 
devaluations.  Answering  our  title’s  question,  for  a  relevant  group  of  firms  “sins”  are 
indeed punished. We find evidence that those firms in hell exhibit balance sheet effects 
during devaluations, both in investment and profitability. However, in our set of panel 
regressions  these  results  are  relatively  less  robust.  We  conclude  that  financial 
vulnerability related to foreign indebtedness cannot be ruled out.  
 
                                                 
40 This finding is consistent with studies on the determinants of investment at the macro level  in Colombia (see Ocampo et. al. , 
1988 and  Fainboim, 1990).    ￿￿￿
This  paper  opens  the  way  for  interesting  further  research.  For  instance,  the 
difficulty  in  disentangling  the  effect  of  dollar  indebtedness  on  firm  performance  is 
probably due to the fact that there is a small degree of dollarization of liabilities. Thus, it 
might be worthwhile to analyze the subset of firms that engaged in dollar indebtedness 
vis-à-vis  other  similar  firms  that  did  not.  Sample  selection  models  popularized  by 
Heckman and others could help in this regard. Also, further research might concentrate 
on those firms that actually disappeared during this period of study, as a special case of 
vulnerability in our sample.
41  
￿
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41 Mejía (2003) is a first approximation to this issue.   ￿￿￿
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Appendix 1.  Variable definition 
 
In this appendix, we list the main variables used in the analysis and explain how we 
modified the data set. The following were excluded: 
1)  Firms that do not appear in the sample for at least four consecutive years. This 
results in dropping 6700 firms, which account for roughly 44% of the sample  
2)  65  firms  that  have  no  change  at  all  in  their  level  of  assets  or  liabilities  in 
consecutive years.  
3)  6 firms reporting unrealistically low levels of assets. In particular, firms whose 
assets do not exceed $100,000 Colombian pesos (US$35 at current exchange 
rates), which is nearly a third of the legal minimum monthly wage.  
4)  868 firms displaying inconsistent accounting information, including: 
§  firms having liabilities that exceed the value of their assets (812 firms) 
§  negative operational income (4 firms) 
§  short-term assets larger than total assets (7 firms) 
§  firms  reporting  negative  values  for  their  total  liabilities,  any  of  its 
components, or on interests on their financial liabilities (24 firms) 
§  firms in which components of liabilities exceed the total (foreign, domestic, 
trade and financial, 21 firms) 
5)  For  estimation  purposes,  we  also  check  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  to  the 
exclusion of outliers (firms for which our measures of investment lie in the upper 
or lower 3% of the sample). In a number of estimations, we are also obliged to 
drop firms for which we do not have (or are unable to impute) denomination of 
output and inputs in terms of currencies. 1064 firms (964 belonging to the retail 
sector) are dropped because of these criteria.  
 
Import input shares were imputed to each firm by mapping each firm’s sector with the 
most disaggregated sector available in National Accounts Data. Sectoral imported input 
shares were computed as the ratio of imported intermediate purchases by each sector 
to total intermediate purchases,  both domestic and imported. Such  data is available 
from  the  economy-wide  input-output  matrix,  with  60  sectors  being  the  thinner 
disaggregation  available.  In  constructing  inventory  investment,  the  real  change  in 
inventories  was  computed  by  deflating  the  original  firm  level  data  by  the  most 
disaggregated data available on sectoral producer price indices (PPI).  In those cases 
were there was no satisfactory disaggregation of the PPI to match the firm’s sector, total 





1.  Total Debt=Total liabilities.  Balance sheet. 
2.  Short-term Debt=Total liabilities due in less than one year.  Balance sheet.   ￿￿￿
3.  Foreign or “Dollar” Debt= Liabilities with foreign banks, corporations and foreign 
suppliers (long and short-term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
4.  Short-term  Foreign  Debt=Short-term  liabilities  with  foreign  banks,  corporations 
and foreign suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
5.  Foreign Financial Debt= Liabilities with foreign banks and corporations (long and 
short-term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
6.  Foreign Trade Debt= Liabilities with foreign suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, no. 
9. 
7.  Domestic  Debt=  Liabilities  with  domestic  banks,  corporations  and  national 
suppliers (long and short-term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
8.  Short-term Domestic Debt=Current liabilities with domestic banks, corporations 
and suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
9.  Domestic Financial Debt= Liabilities with domestic banks and corporations (long 
and short-term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
10. Domestic Trade Debt= Liabilities with national suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, 
no. 9. 
11. Leverage=Total liabilities as a share of total assets in the balance sheet.  
Investment Variables 
1.  Investment in fixed capital= Net purchase  of properties, plant  and equipment.  
Cash flow. For estimation, this variable is expressed as % of total assets. 
Other Relevant Variables 
1.  Total assets.  Balance sheet. 
2.  Exports= Operational income generated abroad.  Balance sheet annex, no. 15. 
Macroeconomic Variables 
1.  Real  exchange  rate  index  and  bilateral  exchange  rate.  Source:  Banco  de  la 
República. 
2.  Real interest rate. Source: Superintendencia Bancaria. 
3.  Sectoral output and sectoral output growth. Source: DANE.   ￿￿￿
Appendix 2.  Capital stock series at replacement costs 
 
An ideal measure of fixed capital investment should consider the rate of change 
of the capital stock series at replacement costs. Nonetheless, a number of difficulties 
with balance sheet information led us to construct instead a measure of fixed capital 
investment  from  cash  flow  data.  This  Appendix  describes  some  of  the  obstacles  in 
constructing a satisfactory capital stock series at replacement costs based on balance 
sheet  information.  Our  data  set  contains  information  on  purchases,  inflation 
adjustments, depreciation, valuation, and provisions, for 24 types of assets. While firms’ 
asset  valuation  should  in  principle  be  a  good  approximation  of  the  capital  stock’s 
“replacement  value”—firms  must  declare  such  value  on  the  basis  of  a  “technical 
assessment”—in practice the series is probably correlated with firms’ tax burden and 
access to credit. 
 
A suitable alternative would therefore be to correct balance sheet data on fixed 
assets in order to get a good estimate of the replacement cost of capital.  Reasonable 
assumptions  on  rates  of  investment,  depreciation,  and  price  of  capital  for  different 
sectors and types of capital must be obtained in order to use the perpetual inventory 
formula for  that purpose.  For  the  Colombian  case  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  satisfactory 
assumptions on these variables for the wide range of sectors and assets of our data set. 
For instance, although it is possible to gather information on average investment by 
sector and type of asset for the manufacturing sector from the yearly manufacturing 
survey, this is based on the book-value and not on the replacement value of assets. 
Regarding economically meaningful depreciation rates, the only source of information 
on  depreciation  rates  by  sector  and  type  is  Pombo  (1999),  available  only  for  the 
manufacturing  sector.  Combining  this  rates  with  accounting  data  often  implies  a 
negative  capital  stock  series.  An  alternative  is  to  consider  “reasonable  rates”  of 
depreciation for each type of asset following estimations by Harberger (1973). Yet, such 
estimations  are  definitely  out  of  date  and  cover  only  the  manufacturing  sector. 
Accounting rates of depreciation from our data set are not satisfactory either, since they 
must be calculated from data on accumulated depreciation and often result in negative 
depreciation rates. Regarding the price of capital, there are implicit deflators of fixed 
capital formation by type of assets (4 broad categories), as well as a weighted average 
for the whole economy. For the period 1995-2001 we can find a thinner desegregation 
of categories, but for the “historical” rates of asset price inflation that enter the perpetual 
inventory formula there are but 4 categories and again no disaggregation by sector. 
 
In  short,  there  is  no  satisfactory  measure  of  the  capital  stock  at  replacement 
costs  from  the  balance  sheet  information  in  our  data  set,  nor  a  convincing  set  of 
assumptions to correct the book value of fixed assets. The rate of investment from cash 
flow  information  provides  a  better  measure  of  the  evolution  of  capital  stock  for  our 
sample of firms.   ￿￿￿
 
Appendix 3.  The BC set-up: summary and extensions 
￿
A summary of the BC set-up 
 
In a two-period world, a continuum of firms holding a fraction ￿ of their total liabilities 
(normalized to 1) in dollars seek to maximize their profits in period t+1 as given by: 
￿
& ￿’   1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ; , ( + + + + + + - = t t t t t t t K W r K F e g K e b b p !￿
￿
The first term at the right hand side of (2) are earnings before interest payments.  For 
each firm, the capital stock at period t, Kt, is predetermined, as is their fraction of dollar 
debt.  Function g captures the response of profits to changes in the real exchange rate. 
Firms borrow capital at an interest rate that is decreasing in net worth (W): 
￿
& ￿’   )) 1 ( ( b b p - + - = t t t e W !￿
￿
Devaluations reduce net worth because they increase the domestic currency value of 
foreign liabilities. Firms choose  1 + t K  so as to  maximize (2) subject  to (3)  and to  an 
exchange rate level in  period t+1 that exhibits persistence,  ) ( 1 t t e e m = + .  The F.O.C. 
implicitly defines an optimal demand for capital, whose derivation with respect to the 
exchange rate leads to BC’s competitiveness and net-worth channels on investment.
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The  first  term  in  (4)  is  the  “competitiveness  effect”.  BC  consider  the  case  in  which 
0 ) ( ' ; 1 ³ + b t e g . As long as the exchange rate exhibits persistence is such that  0 ) ( ' ³ t e m , 
this implies a positive competitiveness effect of devaluations on  investment. A more 
general  case  —for  instance,  if imported inputs  are  important in  production—  should  
consider that  ) ( ' ; 1 b + t e g  might be negative. The second term in (4), capturing the net 
worth channel, is ambiguous. If  ) ( ' ; 1 b + t e g  is negative, a devaluation reduces earnings 
and net worth, leading to a decline in investment. On the other hand, for a sufficiently 
strong  matching  of  liabilities  and  income  streams  ( 0 ) ( ' ; 1 >> + b t e g ),  earnings  increase 
with a devaluation, leading to higher investment and compensating the rise in foreign 
denominated liabilities (as captured by –￿).  
￿
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Following BC, we consider a “neutral” exchange rate for which the peso value of 









d t t . The differential effect on investment of a devaluation across firms with 
varying levels of “dollar” indebtedness is: 
￿
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From  (5)  it  is  clear  that  the  effect  on  investment  of  a  devaluation  can  be  either 
increasing or decreasing in ￿. BC consider the case of “weak” matching of liabilities, 
where  0





e dg t .
43  This assumption hinges on the fact that  ) ; ( ' 1 b + t e g  has been 
assumed positive. What if imported inputs are so important that  0 ) ; ( ' 1 < + b t e g ?   Then it 
might be that  0





e dg t ;  firms with more dollar debt face a sharper decrease in 
profits as the exchange rate  depreciates. In this case, a  devaluation unambiguously 
decreases investment, and investment falls more in firms with higher dollar debt.  
 
The effect of lower domestic interest rates   
 
Quitting the “dogged” defense of the exchange rate allows interest rates to decrease. 
Thus, in addition to the idiosyncratic decrease in net worth, a macroeconomic channel 
affects the rate at which firms rent capital. Firms maximize profits in period t+1, now 
given by: 
￿
& ￿’   [ ] 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1 ) ; ( ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ; , ( + + + + + + + - + - = t t t t t t t t t K e e r W r K F e g K e b b b p ￿
￿
In (6), the second term for the interest rate shows that higher devaluation expectations 
imply higher domestic interest rates. When the policymaker quits the “dogged” defense 
of  the exchange  rate,  and  a devaluation  does  occur,  expectations for  a  devaluation 
disappear or decrease, and interest rates fall:  0 ) ; ( ' 1
* ³ - + b t t e e r . Firms with a higher 
fraction of peso debt will be favored more by a decrease in domestic interest rates
44. 
F.O.C for firm’s optimization implicitly defines an optimal demand for capital which, in 
addition  to  BC’s  competitiveness  and  net-worth  channels,  depends  on  a 
“macroeconomic channel”:  
                                                 
43 Presumably, risk averse firms will choose a composition of debt that will match the exchange rate sensibilities of their balance 
sheet and income stream. It could also be the case that creditors charge more to firm’s without a proper currency matching. In 
equilibrium there would be a correlation between currency composition of liabilities and the “tradeability” of output.   
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The macro effect (third term on the RHS of (7)) has a simple interpretation.  As long as  
1 ) ( ' 0 < < t e m  —i.e. allowing the exchange rate to weaken today will not lead to a more 
than  proportional  weakening  tomorrow—  a  devaluation  has  a  positive  impact  on 
investment. The total  effect on investment is still ambiguous; ultimately  an empirical 
matter. The differential effect on investment of a devaluation across firms can be found 
by implicit differentiation of (7). This total effect is the sum of the competitiveness and 
net  worth  channels  as  well  as  an  additional  term  capturing  the  “macroeconomic 
channel”:   
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The  way  the  macroeconomic  effect  on  investment  varies  for  firms  with  different 
proportions of dollar debt —the third term at the RHS of (8)— may be interpreted as 
follows.  First,  notice  that  under  the  assumption  of  moderate  persistence  of  the 
exchange rate –-i.e.  0 ) 1 ) ( ' ( < - t e m —  concavity of the production function implies that 
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. Recall that  0 ) ) ( ( '
* > - t t e e r m  and note that for highly “dollar indebted” 
firms interest rates might increase less if devaluation expectations are high, since such 
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  is 
negative and so is the “macroeconomic” channel. In other words,  for firms with a high 
proportion of dollar debt a devaluation, by decreasing domestic interest rates, will result 
in  a  lower  increase  in  investment.    The  combined  effect  of  changes  in  earnings,  in 
liabilities,  and￿ in  domestic  interest  rates  on  the  demand  for  capital  is  theoretically 
ambiguous.   